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DEVOLUTION ISSUES, LEGISLATIVE POWER,  











This is a chapter about disputes that are fundamental to understanding 
much about the nature of legal sovereignty in the contemporary UK 
constitution: so-called « devolution issues ». The focus of the chapter is on 
disputes that occur at the boundaries of primary legislative power between, 
on the one hand, the Westminster Parliament and, on the other hand, any of 
the devolved legislatures in Northern Ireland, Scotland, and Wales. 
Although devolution issues can also arise in other ways - notably out of 
exercises/non-exercises of Ministerial power or the making of secondary 
legislation at the devolved levels1 - it is disputes about primary legislative 
competence that are of first importance to debates about legal sovereignty. 
The concept of legal sovereignty is of course that which attributes ultimate 
law-making authority to a particular institution within a state, where UK 
constitutional orthodoxy would regard the Westminster Parliament as 
sovereign and the devolved legislatures as able to act only within the 
parameters of the powers that have been given to them. However, while that 
understanding still informs much of the case law of the courts, it is 
axiomatic that the political context to devolution is changing and that 
approaches to legal sovereignty may need to be adapted to reflect that fact. 
                                                 
 Professeur de Droit public, Queen’s University, Belfast. My thanks to Professors Antoine 
and Perroud for their kind invitation to the Saint-Étienne workshop at which an earlier version of 
this paper was first presented. 
1 Northern Ireland Act 1998, Sch 10, para 1; Scotland Act 1998, Sch 6, para 1 ; Government 
of Wales Act 2006, Sch 9, para 1. 
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The point is most obviously true given developments in post-referendum 
Scotland, although developments in Northern Ireland and Wales perhaps 
also have the potential to test orthodoxy2. 
The corresponding argument of this chapter is one that is (at least 
superficially) simple: that the courts, through the common law, have already 
done as much as they might legitimately do to address the emerging realities 
of devolution and that they should do no more within the current structures. 
The words « the common law » are here to be emphasised, as it will be seen 
that much of the chapter is ultimately concerned with the potential of, and 
the problems with, « common law constitutionalism »3. While there is no 
single definition of such constitutionalism, it is typically associated with the 
understanding that the common law underpins much of the UK constitution, 
including its concept of legal sovereignty4. At its height, such 
constitutionalism would posit that the courts would be able to reinvent legal 
sovereignty in the light of prevailing political realities, where experience 
with EU membership has already given some insight into how this might be 
done5. However, to the extent that this suggests that the common law could 
easily develop an operative concept of « divided sovereignty » within the 
UK6, the leading case law on devolution issues has so far only really 
touched upon that possibility. This will be seen to beg questions about 
whether the courts should do more by way of developing a « federalising » 
jurisprudence for the UK, or whether the challenge of a « divided 
sovereignty » might better be addressed within the framework of a written 
constitution for the UK. In suggesting that that second option is to be 
                                                 
2 See, at the time of writing, the report of the ‘Smith Commission’ on devolution in Scotland 
at  
https://www.smith-commission.scot/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/The_Smith_Commission_Report-
1.pdf; the Wales Act 2014; and the « Stormont House Agreement » of 23 December 2014, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/390672/Stormont_Ho
use_Agreement.pdf. For the argument that Northern Ireland has long challenged orthodoxy see J. 
MORISON, S. LIVINGSTONE, Reshaping Public Power : Northern Ireland the British 
Constitutional Crisis (Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1995). 
3 For a survey of the leading literature, see J. LESLIE, « Vindicating Common Law 
Constitutionalism » (2010) 30 Legal Studies 301. 
4 For historical context, see HWR WADE, « The Basis of Legal Sovereignty » (1955) 13 
Cambridge Law Journal 172.  
5 HWR WADE, « Sovereignty - Revolution or Evolution ? » (1996) 112 Law Quarterly 
Review 56; Thoburn v Sunderland CC [2003] QB 151 ; and R (Buckinghamshire CC) v Secretary of 
State for Transport [2014] UKSC 3, [2014] 1 WLR 324, 382-3, Lords Neuberger and Mance. But 
compare the European Union Act 2011, s 18. 
6 The term was used by Lord STEYN in Jackson v Attorney-General [2005] UKHL 56, [2006] 
1 AC 262, 302, para 102. On the range of possibilities see R. RAWLINGS, P. LEYLAND, 
A. YOUNG (ed), Sovereignty and the Law : Domestic, European and International Perspectives 
(Oxford University Press, 2013). 
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preferred, the chapter argues that the common law would in that way be left 
to play a role that would be much more in keeping with democratic principle 
- in other words, the common law would complement legal sovereignty 
rather than purport to be the thing that grounds it.  
The analysis proceeds as follows. The next section provides an 
overview of the legal rules that govern devolution issues and how the 
exercise of primary legislative power at the devolved levels can give rise to 
such issues. There then follow two sections that consider, respectively, a 
range of common law statements about the nature of the devolved 
legislatures, and case law on the courts’ approach to statutory interpretation 
when resolving devolution issues. As will become apparent, the courts have 
in these cases made some far-reaching assertions about the democratic 
legitimacy and importance of the devolved legislatures while at the same 
time stopping short of recognising them as legally sovereign, even within a 
« divided » setting. The final substantive section thus analyses those 
assertions and statements with reference to wider considerations of 
constitutional reform, while the conclusion offers some (inevitably 
speculative) comments about likely future developments in the constitution.  
 
 
I. DEVOLUTION AND THE PARAMETERS OF PRIMARY 
LEGISLATIVE POWER 
 
One of the first points that is often made about devolution in the UK is 
that it is asymmetrical in form in the sense that there are significant 
differences between the discrete pieces of Westminster legislation - often 
referred to collectively as « the devolution Acts » - that have devolved 
power to Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales7. This is true not just of the 
policy areas in respect of which primary legislative competence has been 
devolved, but also of how that competence is described and defined within 
the various devolution Acts. For instance, under the Northern Ireland Act 
1998 and the Scotland Act 1998, the Northern Ireland Assembly and the 
Scottish Parliament have been said to enjoy competence on the basis of a 
« reserved powers » model whereby they can legislate in all policy areas 
save for those that have been reserved to the Westminster Parliament8 
(although both Acts recognise that exercises of devolved competence may 
                                                 
7 For an account written at the time when devolution commenced, see N. BURROWS, 
Devolution (Sweet and Maxwell, London, 2000). 
8 Re Agricultural Sector (Wales) Bill [2014] UKSC 43, [2014] 1 WLR 2622, 2629, para 29, 
Lords Reed and Thomas. 
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touch upon excluded matters but that that need not automatically mean that 
devolved competence has been exceeded)9. This « reserved powers » model 
has then been contrasted with that which applies under the Government of 
Wales Act 2006, which has been described as a « conferred powers » model 
that enumerates the competences of the National Assembly for Wales and 
allows it to enact primary legislation only in the policy areas listed in Part 1 
of Schedule 7 to the Act of 200610 (the 2006 Act also recognises that not all 
devolved choices that touch upon excluded matters need automatically be 
deemed ultra vires)11. This Welsh model is plainly different insofar as it 
suggests a more closely defined devolution of power to the National 
Assembly for Wales, although elements of that modelling can arguably also 
be seen in parts of the Northern Ireland Act 1998. This is the result of that 
Act’s distinction between « reserved » and « excepted » matters whereby 
reserved matters can be transferred to the Northern Ireland Assembly under 
favourable political circumstances - as happened with policing and criminal 
justice in 2010 - but where excepted matters can be expected only ever to 
remain with the Westminster Parliament12. On this reading, excepted matters 
under the Northern Ireland Act 1998 would fall within the parameters of the 
reserved powers model in its strict sense - the Scotland Act 1998 in fact here 
uses the term «reserved » instead of « excepted » - while reserved matters 
that are transferred to the Northern Ireland Assembly might be said to have 
been conferred upon it. 
Within the framework set by such structural differences, the devolution 
Acts do, however, have many features that are similar, if not identical, in 
their effects. One is the inclusion of a proviso whereby nothing in the 
devolution scheme is to be taken to affect the power of the Westminster 
Parliament to make law for Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales13. This 
proviso is interesting insofar as it gives some insight into the tension that 
exists between constitutional theory and political reality under the 
devolution settlement. For instance, from a theoretical perspective, the 
                                                 
9 Northern Ireland Act 1998, s 6(3) ; Scotland Act 1998, s 29(3). 
10 Re Agricultural Sector (Wales) Bill [2014] UKSC 43, [2014] 1 WLR 2622, 2629, para 29, 
Lords REED and THOMAS. 
11 Government of Wales Act 2006, s 108(5). 
12 Reserved matters are listed in Sch 3 to the Northern Ireland Act 1998, where transfer is 
governed by s 4 (which also provides for a process whereby transferred matters can become 
reserved). Excepted matters are listed in Sch 2. On the devolution of policing and criminal justice 
see G. ANTHONY « Northern Ireland : The Devolution of Policing and Criminal Justice » (2011) 
17 European Public Law 197. Note also that the Northern Ireland Assembly can legislate in relation 
to a reserved matter or an excepted matter with the consent of the Secretary of State for Northern 
Ireland and under the conditions specified in ss 8 & 15 of the Northern Ireland Act 1998. 
13 Northern Ireland Act 1998, s 5(6) ; Scotland Act 1998, s 28(7) ; Government of Wales Act 
2006, s 107(5). 
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proviso does nothing other than reflect orthodox understandings of legal 
sovereignty under the UK constitution and the view that the Westminster 
Parliament « can make or unmake any law whatever »14. However, in a 
practical sense, it is a commonplace that the Westminster Parliament will 
not legislate in an area of devolved competence save where one or more of 
the devolved legislatures by motion asks it to do so. This is the content of 
the Sewel Convention that was first discussed in the context of Scottish 
devolution and according to which « Westminster [will] not normally 
legislate with regard to devolved matters in Scotland without the consent of 
the Scottish Parliament »15. This convention has since been written into a 
Memorandum of Understanding that addresses inter-governmental relations 
under devolution, where it applies not just to the Scottish Parliament but 
also to the Northern Ireland Assembly and the National Assembly for 
Wales16. While the Memorandum of Understanding again notes that ultimate 
legislative power rests with the Westminster Parliament, the political reality 
has been very much that Sewel has been observed and that is has worked at 
the initiative of the devolved institutions. In a memorably titled article that 
analysed Sewel in the early years of devolution, Batey and Page thus 
referred to Westminster as « Scotland’s other parliament »17. 
Similarities can also be found in the provisions of the devolution Acts 
that expressly delimit the competence of the legislatures in Northern Ireland, 
Scotland and Wales and which are central to devolution issues in the courts. 
Although the provisions in the Acts inevitably reflect the reserved/conferred 
differences as well as other differences borne of historical experience - for 
instance, the Northern Ireland Assembly is subject to an express prohibition 
on religious or political discrimination that is not replicated in the legislation 
that applies to Scotland and Wales18 - there are a number of co-equivalent 
limitations that reflect the wider (contemporary) context within which 
legislative choices might be made. The most germane of these concern EU 
law and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), where each of 
the devolved legislatures is constrained by the UK’s Treaty obligations as 
have effect in domestic law under the European Communities Act 1972 and 
                                                 
14 A.V. DICEY, An Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (Macmillan, 
London, 10th ed, 1959) p. 40. 
15 HL Debates, vol 592, part 191, 21 July 1998, col 791. 
16 Devolution : Memorandum of Understanding and Supplementary Agreements, para 14, 
available at   
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/316157/MoU_
between_the_UK_and_the_Devolved_Administrations.pdf . 
17 A. BATEY, A. PAGE, « Scotland’s other parliament : Westminster legislation about 
devolved matters in Scotland since devolution » (2002) Public Law 501. 
18 Northern Ireland Act 1998, s 6(2)(e). 
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the Human Rights Act 1998, respectively19. These limitations are of course 
intended to ensure not just that the devolved legislatures observe the UK’s 
obligations but also (and thereby) to offer some protection to the UK 
government which would otherwise be the named respondent in any 
proceedings that might be brought in the Luxembourg or Strasbourg 
courts20. However, of more immediate relevance here is the possibility that 
either EU law and/or the ECHR might be used to challenge legislation in the 
UK courts themselves, whether through pre-enactment referral of a Bill to 
the Supreme Court by a Law Officer or through post-enactment challenge in 
a concrete case21. While the nature of any referral or challenge will always 
depend on the content to the devolved choice at hand, the legislation will 
inevitably have a policy component that corresponds with the preferred 
position of the devolved legislature. Under those circumstances - and in 
particular where the facts of a case engage the proportionality principle - the 
reviewing court will have to address questions of relative institutional 
expertise and the domestic law relevance of European law’s « margin of 
appreciation » doctrine22.  
Referrals of, and challenges to, legislation can also engage interpretive 
obligations under each of the devolution Acts that, while not imposed in 
directly equivalent terms, have essentially the same practical effects23. The 
obligations in question become relevant where legislation is, on a literal 
reading, outside the competence of a devolved legislature, when the 
devolution Acts require the courts to adopt an interpretive approach that 
will, where possible, give the legislation a meaning that is within the 
competence of the relevant legislature. Where the legislation in question is 
challenged for the reason that it is contrary to EU law and/or the ECHR, 
there will inevitably be some overlap with interpretive obligations that are 
                                                 
19 Northern Ireland Act 1998, s 6(2)(c)-(d) ; Scotland Act 1998, s 29(d) ; Government of 
Wales Act 2006, s 108(6)(c). Note that the devolved legislatures are each limited by a territorial rule 
whereby they can legislate only in respect of Northern Ireland, Scotland, and Wales respectively : 
Northern Ireland Act 1998, s 6(2)(a), as read with s 98 ; Scotland Act 1998, s 29(a), as read with s 
126 ; Government of Wales Act 2006, s 108(4)(b), as read with s 158(1). 
20 On the corresponding approach to costs in EU law cases see Devolution : Memorandum of 
Understanding and Supplementary Agreements, at n 16 above, part B4.25. 
21 On the referral of Bills see Northern Ireland Act 1998, s 11 ; Scotland Act 1998, s 33 ; and 
the Government of Wales Act 2006, s 112. It might be noted that, on a narrow reading of the 
devolution Acts, referrals of Bills do not come within the meaning of « devolution issues », as the 
relevant statutory definitions refer only to « Acts » of the legislatures : Northern Ireland Act 1998, 
Sch 10, para 1 ; Scotland Act 1998, Sch 6, para 1 ; and the Government of Wales Act 2006, Sch 9, 
para 1. 
22 See, on EU law, see, mutatis mutandis, Re McParland’s Application [2002] NI 292. On the 
ECHR see R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Daly [2001] 2 AC 532. 
23 Northern Ireland Act 1998, s 83 ; Scotland Act 1998, s 101 ; Government of Wales Act 
2006, s 154. 
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found in the European Communities Act 1972 and/or the Human Rights Act 
1998, and arguments may be developed with first reference to those Acts 
rather than the devolution Acts24. However, where the obligation arises 
because the legislation transgresses (where relevant) the reserved or 
conferred powers models that delimit the respective competences of the 
devolved legislatures, the matter of interpretation can be resolved only with 
reference to the terms of the devolution Acts themselves. The corresponding 
provisions have since given rise to an important body of Supreme Court case 
law that has identified some general principles that should guide the courts 
when interpreting legislation enacted by the devolved legislatures, where an 
orthodox view of legal sovereignty has been influential25. The corresponding 
significance of this link to orthodoxy is returned to below, but the point to 
be noted here is that the courts start from the position that it is not for them 
« to say whether legislation on any particular issue is better made by [a 
devolved legislature] or by the UK Parliament at Westminster »26. Where, 
on this basis, a court concludes, through interpretation, that a piece of 
devolved legislation cannot be read as within the competence the relevant 
devolved legislature, it may therefore grant any of the forms of relief that are 
available to it (albeit that it may also remove or limit any retrospective effect 
of a ruling)27. Where the transgression is in respect of EU law and/or the 
ECHR, a court may also first consider whether to grant remedies in 
accordance with the terms of the European Communities Act 1972 and/or 
the Human Rights Act 199828. 
Of course, the above provides only a summary of some of the key 
aspects of the devolution Acts and there are many more points of detail that 
might be explored in any fuller account of the current arrangements for 
devolution29. Nevertheless, those aspects that have been outlined above have 
                                                 
24 European Communities Act 1972, s 3(1) ; Human Rights Act 1998, s 3. For recognition of 
the scope for overlap, albeit at the level of challenges to the exercise of executive powers, see, eg, H 
v Lord Advocate [2012] UKSC 24, [2013] 1 AC 413, 434, para 26, Lord HOPE. 
25 See, most notably, Attorney General v National Assembly for Wales Commission [2012] 
UKSC 53, [2013] 1 AC 792 and Imperial Tobacco Ltd v Lord Advocate [2012] UKSC 61, (2013) 
SC (UKSC) 153. 
26 Martin v HM Advocate [2010] UKSC 10, (2010) SC (UKSC) 40, 44, para 5, Lord HOPE. 
27 Northern Ireland Act 1998, s 81 ; Scotland Act 1998, s 102 ; Government of Wales Act 
2006, s 153. And see, eg, Salvesen v Riddell [2013] UKSC 22, (2013) SC (UKSC) 236 (Supreme 
Court suspending the effect of its finding that section 72 of the Agricultural Holdings [Scotland] Act 
2003 was incompatible with Article 1 of Protocol 1 ECHR for 12 months or such shorter period as 
was necessary for the legislation to be amended). 
28 European Communities Act 1972, s 3 ; Human Rights Act 1998, ss 3-4, & 8. 
29 See, as regards, Scotland and Wales, P. CRAIG, Administrative Law (Sweet & Maxwell, 
London, 7th ed, 2012), ch 7 ; and on Northern Ireland see G. ANTHONY, Judicial Review in 
Northern Ireland (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2nd ed, 2014), pp. 22-24 & 156-165. 
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a particular relevance insofar as they explain how devolution issues can 
arise and how a law/politics tension can surround their resolution. The point 
here is that, while the courts may be of the view that it is not for them to 
decide whether legislation is better made by a devolved legislature or the 
Westminster Parliament, that matter is fundamental to understanding where 
legal sovereignty rests found within the contemporary constitution. 
Moreover, to the extent that the courts have said that it is not their function 
to determine who should make which law, and when, their recourse to 
orthodoxy can have only that very effect because it safeguards the 
historically dominant position of the Westminster Parliament. Given the 
point, the question, once more, is whether the courts should continue to 
safeguard orthodoxy or whether they should jettison that orthodoxy in 
favour of a more nuanced common law conception of « divided 
sovereignty ».  
 
 
II. THE (COMMON LAW) STATUS OF THE DEVOLVED 
LEGISLATURES 
 
Turning to the case law that has considered the constitutional 
significance of devolution, there are two rulings that are often cited as of 
particular note, namely Robinson v Secretary of State for Northern Ireland30 
and Axa General Insurance v HM Advocate31. In these cases, the House of 
Lords and Supreme Court, respectively, made expansive statements about 
the nature and reach of the devolution settlements and their basis in 
democratic principle. However, to the extent that the judgments suggested 
the emergence of a creative body of devolution case law32, there have since 
been other cases in which the Supreme Court has perhaps been less 
inventive in its reasoning. Robinson and Axa might therefore best be 
described as the « high-water mark » of a more generally cautious 
constitutional jurisprudence33. 
The facts of the Robinson case were unique in the sense that they arose 
out of the Northern Ireland peace process and were concerned not with a 
                                                 
30 [2002] UKHL 32, [2002] NI 390. 
31 [2011] UKSC 46, [2012] 1 AC 868. 
32 For the point as regards Robinson, M. ELLIOTT, « Embracing Constitutional Legislation : 
Towards Fundamental Law ? » (2003) 54 Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 25, at 41. For more 
general public law analysis of Axa, see P. RONCHI, « Axa v Lord Advocate : putting the axa to 
parliamentary sovereignty » (2013) 19 European Public Law 61. 
33 A. TOMKINS, « Confusion and Retreat : The Supreme Court on Devolution », UK Const L 
Blog (19th Feb 2015) (available at http://ukconstitutionallaw.org/)). 
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devolution issue as described above but rather with the interpretation of key 
provisions of the Northern Ireland Act 1998 itself. The proceedings were 
brought by the Democratic Unionist Party which was at that time (though is 
no longer) opposed to the peace process, and it hoped, through the 
proceedings, to undermine the workings of the Northern Ireland Assembly 
that had been established pursuant to the Good Friday Agreement of 1998. 
The central issue in the case was the reading to be given to a six-week time-
limit in the Act for the election by the Northern Ireland Assembly of 
the First and Deputy First Ministers and a corresponding duty on the 
Secretary of State to set a date for fresh public elections to the Assembly in 
the event that the Ministers were not elected within that time-frame34. On 
the facts of the case the First and Deputy First Ministers had been elected 
shortly outside the six-week time-limit and the Democratic Unionist Party 
argued that this should have led the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland 
to call prompt Assembly elections rather than to set the delayed date that he 
had chosen given that the Ministers had been elected. Of course, had the 
Democratic Unionist Party succeeded in its arguments, this would have 
caused considerable political instability in Northern Ireland, and it was that 
prospect that provided much of the backdrop to the House of Lords ruling. 
In a judgment that very much sought to safeguard political stability, Lord 
Hoffmann held that the relevant provisions of the Northern Ireland Act 1998 
should be given a purposive interpretation because the Good Friday 
Agreement « was the product of multi-party negotiations to devise 
constitutional arrangements for a fresh start in Northern Ireland … The 1998 
Act is a constitution for Northern Ireland, framed to create a continuing 
form of government against the history of the territory and the principles 
agreed in Belfast »35. Lord Bingham to like effect stated that :  
« The 1998 Act does not set out all the constitutional provisions 
applicable to Northern Ireland, but it is in effect a constitution. So to 
categorise the 1998 Act is not to relieve the courts of their duty to 
interpret the constitutional provisions in issue. But the provisions 
should, consistently with the language used, be interpreted generously 
and purposively, bearing in mind the values which the constitutional 
provisions are intended to embody »36. 
 
 
                                                 
34 Northern Ireland Act 1998, ss 16(8) & 32(3). Note that s 16 has since been repealed and 
replaced by ss 16 (A)-(C) : Northern Ireland (St Andrews Agreement) Act 2006, s 8. 
35 [2002] NI 390, 402, para 25. 
36 [2002] NI 390, 398, para 11. 
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This reasoning provides some insight into the nature of common law 
constitutionalism and, in particular, its approach to the interpretation of 
statutes37. While statutory interpretation is not the sole concern of common 
law constitutionalism - it also addresses itself to the protection of 
fundamental rights and, indeed, does so even in the era of the Human Rights 
Act 199838 - the judicial approach to statutes is key to understanding any 
argument about how the courts might reconfigure the constitution. Of 
particular importance here is the concept of « common law constitutional 
statutes », which was first developed in the context of EU membership and 
which finds clear parallels in Robinson39. According to that concept, there 
are a number of statutes, including the devolution Acts, that constitute a 
higher form of law and are not subject to the doctrine of implied repeal 
whereby later Acts of the Westminster Parliament override earlier Acts in 
the event that there is a conflict between the two40. While the case law has 
not yet suggested that the Westminster Parliament cannot repeal the 
constitutional statutes under any circumstances, it has said that it can repeal 
the statutes only where it uses express words to achieve that outcome or 
« words so specific that the inference of an actual determination to effect the 
result contended for [is] irresistible »41. Common law constitutional statutes 
have, in that way, apparently imposed formal limitations on legal 
sovereignty and, given this development, it may well be that the courts could 
also impose substantive limitations on the Westminster Parliament’s powers 
given the emerging political realities of devolution42.  
The Axa ruling of the Supreme Court then came close to considering 
this possibility. The facts of this case concerned a challenge to the 
lawfulness of an Act of the Scottish Parliament that had been enacted to 
allow individuals to sue for particular harms that they had suffered while 
working in Scotland’s heavy industries (the legislation - the Damages 
(Asbestos-related Conditions) (Scotland) Act 2009 - reversed the effects of 
an earlier House of Lords ruling that had held that the harms in question 
                                                 
37 See further, G. ANTHONY, « Statutory Interpretation and the Judicial Role in the United 
Kingdom » (2012) 24 European Review of Public Law 1387. 
38 M. ELLIOTT, « Beyond the European Convention : Human Rights and the Common Law » 
(2015) 68 Current Legal Problems (forthcoming). 
39 Thoburn v Sunderland CC [2003] QB 151 ; and R (Buckinghamshire CC) v Secretary of 
State for Transport [2014] UKSC 3, [2014] 1 WLR 324, 382-3, Lords NEUBERGER and MANCE. 
But see also the European Union Act 2011, s 18. 
40 Thoburn v Sunderland CC [2003] QB 151, 186-7, Laws LJ. On implied repeal see Ellen 
Street Estates v Minister of Health [1934] 1 KB 590, 597, Maugham LJ. 
41 Thoburn v Sunderland CC [2003] QB 151, 187, Laws LJ. 
42 For the logic of this argument see M. ELLIOTT, n 32 above. 
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were not actionable under the law of tort)43. In real terms, this meant that 
Axa and a number of other insurance companies would have to meet a very 
large number of claims against employers, and they challenged the 
legislation on the basis that it was both disproportionate in its interference 
with their property rights under Article 1 of Protocol 1 ECHR and irrational 
at common law. In rejecting the challenge, the Supreme Court centred much 
of its reasoning upon democratic principle and the need for the courts to 
avoid any undue interference with the choices of an elected legislature. In 
relation to Article 1 of Protocol 1 ECHR, the Supreme Court thus noted that 
property rights are qualified rights; that the case law of the European Court 
of Human Rights accords states a wide margin of appreciation when limiting 
such rights for reasons of « the public interest »44 ; and that judicial 
intervention on ECHR grounds in this case could not be justified because it 
could not be said that the Scottish legislation lacked a « reasonable 
foundation » or was « manifestly unreasonable »45. The arguments based 
upon irrationality then likewise failed because the Court was of the view that 
the constitutional nature of the Scottish Parliament meant that its legislative 
choices should not be open to challenge on that ground. While Lords Hope 
and Reed stated that the Scottish Parliament cannot be regarded as legally 
sovereign in the sense that the Westminster Parliament can be so regarded, 
they emphasised that the broader design of the Scotland Act 1998 entails 
that the Scottish Parliament should be taken to have very wide powers 
within the areas of competence that have been devolved to it. For Lord 
Hope, this resulted from the Scottish Parliament’s status as a « self-standing 
democratically elected legislature. Its democratic mandate to make laws for 
the people of Scotland is beyond question »46 ; while Lord Reed considered 
that, « (w)ithin the limits set by section 29(2) ... its power to legislate is as 
ample as it could possibly be: there is no indication in the Scotland Act of 
any specific purposes which are to guide it in its law-making or of any 
specific matters to which it is to have regard »47. 
It is important to be clear quite where the significance of the Axa ruling 
lies. Certainly, it might, on one reading, be said that the judgment did little 
to unsettle constitutional orthodoxy as it reiterated that the Scottish 
Parliament is not legally sovereign and is « subordinate to the United 
Kingdom Parliament : its powers can be modified, extended or revoked by 
                                                 
43 Rothwell v Chemical & Insulating Co Ltd [2007] UKHL 39, [2008] 1 AC 281. 
44 Citing, most prominently, James v UK (1986) 8 EHRR 123. 
45 See [2012] 1 AC 868, 907-8, para 33, Lord HOPE.  
46 See [2012] 1 AC 868, 911, para 46.  
47 See [2012] 1 AC 868, 944, para 146.  
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an Act of the United Kingdom Parliament »48. On the other hand, the 
judgment might also be said to be one of the leading authorities on common 
law constitutionalism, as it not only acknowledged that the Scottish 
Parliament is a « self-standing democratically elected legislature » but also 
that its powers, and those of the Westminster Parliament, may potentially be 
subject to equivalent common law constraints. This was a point about the 
common law’s protection of fundamental rights that has been alluded to 
above, as, to the extent that the Supreme Court held that common law 
irrationality is not available to challenge Acts of the Scottish Parliament, it 
stated that the common law would intervene if the Scottish Parliament 
enacted legislation that interfered with a common law fundamental right 
such as access to justice49. This is an approach that has previously been 
advocated in relation to Acts of the Westminster Parliament that threaten 
such rights and, by adapting the relevant dicta to the devolved context, the 
Supreme Court made clear that the rule of law will be the organising 
principle of the UK’s constitution, come what may50. Axa, in that way, has 
made clear that the current concept of legal sovereignty is mediated by the 
prior force of the rule of law and that the same would be true in any 
constitution that might be centred upon a conception of « divided 
sovereignty ».  
 
 
III. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AND THE RESOLUTION OF 
« DEVOLUTION ISSUES » 
 
The less inventive line of judicial reasoning that was noted above can 
also be associated with two main rulings, both of which were delivered in 
2012. The first was given in Attorney General v National Assembly for 
Wales Commission51, which was a pre-enactment reference to the Supreme 
Court of provisions of the Local Government Byelaws (Wales) Bill 2012. 
That Bill - now Act - had sought to « spring-clean » the process of making 
certain byelaws for Wales by (a) removing the requirement that byelaws in a 
Schedule to the Bill would need to be confirmed by either Welsh Ministers 
                                                 
48 See [2012] 1 AC 868, 944, para 146, Lord REED.  
49 See, eg, [2012] 1 AC 868, 913, para 51, Lord HOPE. For a subsequent - unsuccessful - 
attempt to develop this aspect of Axa in the context of legislation enacted by the Northern Ireland 
Assembly, see Re CM’s Application for Leave [2013] NIQB 145 (challenge to time-limits contained 
in the Historical Institutional Abuse Act (Northern Ireland) 2013, s 19). 
50 See [2012] 1 AC 868, 913, paras 50-51, Lord HOPE, citing R (Jackson) v Attorney General 
[2005] UKHL 56, [2006] 1 AC 262.  
51 [2012] UKSC 53, [2013] 1 AC 792.  
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and/or the Secretary of State for Wales and (b) allowing the Welsh Ministers 
to add to the relevant Schedule of byelaws52. The Attorney General referred 
the Bill to the Supreme Court for the reason that it purported to remove the 
functions of a Minister of the Crown, which is a matter falling outside the 
competence of the National Assembly for Wales under the Government of 
Wales Act 200653. However, the Supreme Court held that the provisions of 
the Bill were within the competence of National Assembly and that they 
could therefore lawfully be enacted. Noting that the primary, lawful purpose 
of the Bill was to remove the need for confirmation of byelaws by Welsh 
Ministers, it held that those provisions that affected Ministers of the Crown 
were « incidental to, or consequential on » that primary purpose54. While the 
Supreme Court also acknowledged that the power to add byelaws to the 
Schedule was potentially open-ended and could thereby be read as ultra 
vires, it held that the corresponding provision should be read « as narrowly 
as is required for it to be within competence »55. In real terms, this meant 
that the power to add byelaws could be exercised only where the primary 
purpose was, again, to reduce the need for Welsh Ministers to confirm 
byelaws.  
The second ruling was given in Imperial Tobacco Ltd v Lord 
Advocate56, which concerned the vires of sections 1 and 9 of the Tobacco 
and Primary Medical Services (Scotland) Act 2010. According to those 
sections, it is a criminal offence either to advertise tobacco products in the 
course of business (section 1) or to have a vending machine available for use 
on premises under one’s management or control (section 9). Imperial 
Tobacco argued that the legislation thereby regulated aspects of consumer 
protection and Scots criminal law and that it was ultra vires the Scotland 
Act 1998 because the aspects in question were reserved matters within the 
meaning of Schedule 5 to the Scotland Act 1998. However, the Supreme 
Court rejected that argument when holding that the Act of 2010 did not in 
any way relate to reserved matters and that, on a true construction of the 
legislation, it fell squarely within the competence of the Scottish Parliament. 
Sections 1 & 9 were thus said to have the objective of reducing levels of 
smoking and were thereby about public health - a devolved matter - rather 
than consumer protection and/or reserved matters of criminal law. 
The parts of the rulings that revealed a less inventive judicial approach 
to devolution issues were concerned with the interpretation of the devolution 
                                                 
52 See ss 6 & 9 of the Bill/Act.  
53 See Sch 7, Part 2, para 1(1).  
54 Government of Wales Act 2006, s 108(5).  
55 Government of Wales Act 2006, s 154. 
56 [2012] UKSC 61, (2013) SC (UKSC) 153.  
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Acts. While the Supreme Court did not doubt in either case that the 
devolution Acts have a particular constitutional significance - it referred to 
them as « constitutional statutes » - it cautioned that the ordinary rules of 
statutory interpretation still apply and that a more expansive interpretive 
approach is not inevitable just because the Court is dealing with devolution 
issues. In doing so, the Supreme Court used language that was reflective of 
the (orthodox) reality that the devolution Acts were enacted by the 
Westminster Parliament and that that legislature’s intentions must be 
observed when resolving disputes about competence. In the Welsh Byelaws 
case, Lord Hope thus said that the question whether devolved legislation is 
within competence « must be determined simply by examining the 
provisions by which the scheme for devolution has been laid out »57. And in 
Imperial Tobacco, his Lordship identified three general principles that 
should guide the courts when ruling on devolution issues: 
« First, the question of competence must be determined in each case 
according to the particular rules that have been set out in [the relevant 
devolution Act]. It is not for the courts to say whether legislation on any 
particular issue is better made by the [devolved legislatures] or by the 
Parliament of the United Kingdom at Westminster … How that issue is 
to be dealt with has been addressed and determined by the United 
Kingdom Parliament ... its task was to define the legislative competence 
of the [devolved legislatures], while itself continuing as the sovereign 
legislature of the United Kingdom … So it is to the rules that the 
[devolution Acts lay] down that the court must address its attention, 
bearing in mind that a provision may have a devolved purpose and yet 
be outside competence because it contravenes one of the rules… 
Second, those rules must be interpreted in the same way as any other 
rules that are found in a UK statute. The system that those rules laid 
down must, of course, be taken to have been intended to create a system 
for the exercise of legislative power by the [devolved legislatures] that 
was coherent, stable and workable. This is a factor that it is proper to 
have in mind. But it is not a principle of construction that is peculiar to 
the [devolution Acts]. It is a factor that is common to any other statute 
that has been enacted by the legislature, whether at Westminster or at 
[Cardiff, Holyrood, or Stormont]. The best way of ensuring that a 
coherent, stable and workable outcome is achieved is to adopt an 
approach to the meaning of a statute that is constant and predictable. 
                                                 
57 Attorney General v National Assembly for Wales Commission [2012] UKSC 53, [2013] 1 
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This will be achieved if the legislation is construed according to the 
ordinary meaning of the words used. 
Third, the description of [an] Act as a constitutional statute cannot 
be taken, in itself, to be a guide to its interpretation. The statute must be 
interpreted like any other statute. But the purpose of the Act has 
informed the statutory language. Its concern must be taken to have been 
that [a devolved legislature] should be able to legislate effectively about 
matters that were intended to be devolved to it, while ensuring that 
there were adequate safeguards for those matters that were intended to 
be reserved [or excepted]. That purpose provides the context for any 
discussion about legislative competence. So it is proper to have regard 
to the purpose if help is needed as to what the words actually mean. The 
fact that [the devolution Acts provide mechanisms] for determining 
whether a provision [in an Act] is outside, rather than inside, 
competence does not create a presumption in favour of competence. 
But it helps to show that one of the purposes of [the devolution Acts] 
was to enable the [devolved legislatures] to make such laws within the 
powers given to [them] as [they] thought fit. It was intended, within 
carefully defined limits, to be a generous settlement of legislative 
authority »58.  
These dicta clearly imply that the Supreme Court will not be inclined to 
use devolution issues to reinvent legal sovereignty under the constitution, 
even if Robinson and Axa had previously given some insight into how 
common law constitutionalism might facilitate a process of change. This 
then inevitably begs the question whether there is something of a disjunction 
in the wider body of devolution case law, where the Supreme Court’s recent 
ruling in the Recovery of Medical Costs for Asbestos Diseases (Wales) Bill 
case would suggest that there is59. This case arose when the Counsel General 
for Wales referred to the Supreme Court the legality of a Bill that would 
allow the Welsh Ministers to recover from employers and their insurance 
companies the costs of treating persons on the National Health Service 
where the employers agree, in the future, to pay compensation to those 
persons for injuries falling under the Bill (the Bill was in that sense 
prospective; it also had a retrospective element in that it applied to insurance 
policies issued both before and after the legislation would come into force). 
The Supreme Court found itself divided over the two main questions before 
                                                 
58 [2012] UKSC 61, (2013) SC (UKSC) 153, 159, paras 13-15, citing, among others, 
Gallagher v Lynn [1937] AC 863 and Martin v Most [2010] SLT 412. For application of the 
principles see, eg, Re Agriculture Sector (Wales) Bill [2014] UKSC 43, [2014] 1 WLR 2622. 
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it, namely : (1) whether the National Assembly for Wales had competence to 
enact the Bill as something falling within a policy area that had been conferred 
upon it (viz « organisation and funding of the national health service »60) ; and 
(2) whether the Bill constituted a disproportionate interference with the rights 
of employers and insurers under Article 1 of Protocol 1 ECHR. The reasoning 
of the majority of the Court in relation to (1) was that the Bill fell outside the 
competence of the Assembly because the expression « organisation and 
funding of the national health service » could not have been intended to 
include a power to impose what was, in effect, a quasi-tortious statutory 
liability (the minority considered that at least part of the Bill related to the 
organisation and so on of the health service and could therefore be read as 
within competence). However, it was in relation to question (2) that the 
differences in constitutional approach between the majority and minority 
were most pronounced, notably on the matter of how the Court should 
assess the fairness of the « public interest » choice that had been made by 
the Welsh legislature. Lord Mance, for the majority, holding that the Bill 
was disproportionate, noted that the fact that « a measure is within a national 
legislature’s margin of appreciation is not conclusive of proportionality » 
and that there is still a judicial role in assessing the lawfulness of a 
legislative choice61. While his Lordship agreed that « weight » should be 
given to the Welsh Assembly’s judgment when conducting that exercise62, 
he reached his conclusions about the Bill without elaborating upon the status 
of the Welsh Assembly and the « difficult » matter whether « there is a 
relevant distinction between cases concerning primary legislation by the 
United Kingdom Parliament and other legislative and executive 
decisions »63. In contrast, Lord Thomas, for the minority, examined this 
constitutional question in some detail and in language that was reflective of 
that in Robinson in Axa. Finding that not all aspects of the Bill were 
disproportionate in their effects, his Lordship stated that « great weight » 
should be given to the public interest choice of the National Assembly for 
Wales and that he « would find it difficult to make any logical distinction in 
the context of the United Kingdom’s devolved constitutional structure 
between [the devolved] legislatures and the United Kingdom Parliament in 
according weight to the evaluation of the different choices and interests in 
respect of matters which are within the primary competence of the 
legislatures »64. Although his Lordship noted that « this is an issue which it 
                                                 
60 Government of Wales Act 2006, Sch 7, Part I, para 9.  
61 [2015] UKSC 3, [2015] 2 WLR 481, 501, para 54.  
62 [2015] UKSC 3, [2015] 2 WLR 481, 507, para 67.  
63 [2015] UKSC 3, [2015] 2 WLR 481, 502, para 56.  
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may not be desirable to have to consider at the present time », he was of the 
view that « the issue plainly arises as to how the court is to treat the 
judgment of the Welsh Assembly, in contradistinction to the United 
Kingdom Parliament, in relation to matter of social and economic policy 
such as the funding of the national health service »65. He concluded that he 
could not « see why in principle the United Kingdom Parliament in making 
legislative choices in relation to England (in relation to matters such as the 
funding of the NHS in England) is to be accorded a status which commands 
greater weight than would be accorded to the Scottish Parliament and the 
Northern Ireland and Welsh Assemblies in relation respectively to Scotland, 
Northern Ireland and Wales »66. 
 
 
IV. LEGAL SOVEREIGNTY AND DEVOLUTION :  
WHAT ROLE FOR THE COURTS ? 
 
Lord Thomas’ comments are undoubtedly the most far-reaching that 
have so far been made about devolution and, in particular, the constitutional 
relationship between the devolved legislatures and the Westminster 
Parliament. Although his Lordship’s comments apparently leave open the 
status of Acts of the Westminster Parliament that are of UK wide-
application, his approach to Acts that apply only to England arguably 
envisages something akin to a federal distribution of competence under the 
constitution. Of course, in a strict sense, this observation rather rather 
assumes a link between devolution and federalism that does not really exist, 
as that latter model has been said to « require the exclusive allocation of 
powers by a written constitution to federal and state/provincial legislatures 
of co-ordinate status with each other »67. Nevertheless, the importance of 
Lord Thomas’ comments lies not in the fact that they may touch upon a state 
of affairs that has not been realised under the UK constitution, but rather in 
what they reveal about the judicial role in remoulding that constitution. The 
nature of common law constitutionalism as has been outlined in this chapter 
is very much that it allows the courts to revisit core precepts of the 
constitution, including legal sovereignty, and to reinvent them in the light of 
changed political circumstances. Given the point, it might be asked whether 
Lord Thomas’ comments should provide a starting point for a jurisprudence 
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that would recognise a concept of « divided sovereignty » in the UK and 
which would seek further to embed the position and authority of the 
devolved legislatures. Is this something that it would be desirable for the 
courts to engage in, or is this something that might legitimately be realised 
only through the political process and, for instance, the adoption of a written 
constitution ? And, if this is a matter that would better be addressed through 
a written constitutional text, what role might the common law play in the 
interim and within the framework of a written constitution ?  
Taking first the question whether Lord Thomas’ comments might mark 
the beginning of a more activist jurisprudence, there are normative and 
practical dimensions to any possible answers. Certainly, at a normative 
level, the argument in favour of his comments would focus upon common 
law constitutionalism’s flexibility in the face of legal and political 
challenges and its ability to refashion principles and doctrines to « fit » with 
their emerging context68. This has already been said, above, to have 
occurred in relation to the common law’s protection of fundamental rights 
and its approach to EU membership, and it might, for that reason, be thought 
that a recasting of legal sovereignty in the context of devolution would 
merely complement such developments. However, the contrasting normative 
view is that such arguments take an essentially uncritical approach to an 
elevated role for the courts and that they thereby give insufficient attention 
to the primacy of the democratic political process69. While arguments about 
the primacy of the political process can sometimes become disingenuous 
when matters of rights are involved - where there is the peril of 
majoritarianism70 - it might reasonably be doubted whether it could ever be 
legitimate for the courts to settle foundational disputes about the balance of 
power between political institutions, at least where there is no written text 
that requires them to do so. Indeed, in this context, the challenge of EU 
membership might be distinguished from that which is currently presented 
by devolution: while the European Communities Act 1972 requires the 
courts to give effect to the doctrine of the primacy of EU law that clearly 
contradicts the sovereignty of the Westminster Parliament - a requirement 
that led the very idea of « constitutional statutes »71 - the devolution Acts 
                                                 
68 See further ELLIOTT, n. 32 above. See also, eg, Re Perry’s Application [1997] NI 282, 
300, GIRVAN J. : « It is a feature of the richness of the common law that old concepts and practices 
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have been written in such a way as is intended to leave legal sovereignty 
solely with that Parliament. 
The practical dimension focuses upon the obvious difficulty in 
designing a workable concept of « divided sovereignty » that might be 
mobilised within an unwritten constitution that would have federalising 
tendencies as defined by the common law. For instance, Lord Thomas’ 
apparent distinction between Acts of the Westminster Parliament that have 
UK-wide application and those that would apply only to England would, if 
acted upon, raise the question whether the latter category is of a lesser 
sovereign quality because of its territorial application and because it is to be 
equated with legislation enacted in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales. 
However, if it is not of a lesser quality and is, in fact, to be equated to an Act 
of UK-wide application, then it might surely be argued that legislation that 
has been enacted in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales is also sovereign 
by virtue of the fact that it can be equated to Westminster legislation that is 
of application in only England. Of course, the very idea of legal sovereignty 
would at this stage start to become circular, and it thus here that the second 
question that was posed above - whether there is a need for a written 
constitution - becomes relevant. The suggestion that the UK might benefit 
from adopting a written constitution is one that has become increasingly 
prominent in recent times - primarily, though by no means exclusively, 
because of developments in post-referendum Scotland72 - and the adoption 
of a constitution would provide one means for the people(s) of the UK to 
endorse a sovereign text. While much would remain to be decided about 
precisely how an allocation of competence would be organised within the 
constitution, a text could surely provide for a reconfiguration of power along 
federal lines that would recognise the existence of co-equivalent « state » 
legislatures in England, Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales, as well as a 
federal legislature at Westminster that is subject to the provisions of the 
constitution. The constitution might in this way be expected to recognise the 
state legislatures as permanent within the framework of the constitution and 
thereby exceed recent post-referendum proposals about the merit of 
Westminster legislating to acknowledge the permanence of the Scottish 
Parliament73.  
                                                 
QB 151 ; and R (Buckinghamshire CC) v Secretary of State for Transport [2014] UKSC 3, [2014] 1 
WLR 324, 382-3, Lords NEUBERGER and MANCE. But compare the European Union Act 2011, s 
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72 For proposals the precede the Scottish referendum and which address the full range of 
issues associated with adopting a constitution, see R. GORDON, Repairing British Politics : A 
Blueprint for Constitutional Change (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2010).  
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And what of the third question that was noted above, viz the role that 
the courts might play in the interim and if/when a constitution is adopted ? 
Certainly, in the interim, it might be said that the courts should not seek to 
develop a more expansive body of devolution case law, as it would appear 
that there would be significant challenges in developing a concept of 
« divided sovereignty » that would be meaningful in practice. Moreover, 
were the courts to seek to progress the law beyond the already creative dicta 
of Robinson, Axa, and Costs for Asbestos Diseases, they might well - and 
rightly - encounter criticisms of undue judicial activism. As things presently 
stand within the case law, the courts have made it clear that the devolved 
legislatures occupy a unique (if ultimately subordinate) place within the 
constitution, while at the same time creating pressure points that hint at the 
diminishing strength of constitutional orthodoxy. In real terms, that is a hint 
that the political settlement that has underpinned the place of the 
Westminster Parliament is no longer guaranteed and that the challenge of 
devolution needs to be addressed in a more fundamental way. While it may 
well be that common law constitutionalism would wish to facilitate or 
hasten that process of change, normative concerns about legitimacy should 
mean that the courts should wait for the political process to fashion a written 
constitution before they develop any reinvigorated body of case law. In that 
circumstance, their rulings could be said simply to complement whatever 
concept of legal sovereignty is written into the constitution rather than to be 





This chapter started by observing that the case law on devolution issues 
is central to understanding the nature of legal sovereignty in the 
contemporary UK constitution. Its resulting argument - that the courts have 
done as much as they might legitimately do within the given structures and 
that any tensions around legal sovereignty would better be addressed 
through a written constitution - plainly presupposes the existence of a 
political will to rebalance the UK’s constitution. Whether that political will 
exists is, however, something of an unknown, and it may be that a written 
constitution is some distance off. While there have certainly been political 
efforts to address the need for fuller devolution in post-referendum 
Scotland74, the general election results of May 2015 have seen a shift 
towards an increasingly muscular nationalism in Scotland and the 
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emergence of Conservative party dominance in England. This has led 
Stephen Tierney to ask whether such competing political philosophies will 
militate against a written constitution for the UK and perhaps even lead to 
the break-up of the Union, for the very reason that it would not be in the 
interests of the emerging political blocs to lock themselves into a new 
constitutional framework75. Whether or not his analysis is right, it is clear 
that the politics that underlie the UK constitution have changed 
fundamentally and forever. For the courts, this is the political reality within 
which they must work and within which they must exercise restraint.  
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